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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JOHNSON READY-MIX CONCRETE
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

No. 9247

UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

RESPONDENTS ADDITIONAL STATEMENT
OF FACTS
Since the statement of facts contained in appellant's
brief are not considered sufficient to give the court a
clear and concise picture of the proceedings below, this
additional state1nent of facts is sub1nitted.
For some year~ the plaintiff carried a public liability Insurance Policy with the defendant United Pacific
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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In~urance

Company. On May 12, 1954, one Blazer while

working as a cement finisher received a bump on his
back against one of plaintiff's concrete mixer trucks.
The n1a tter vvas considered to be a trivial one by all the
persons present at the time and neither Johnson or his
office Inanager knew anything about it until May 14,
1957, when Johnson received a letter from Attorney
C~harles

Olsen stating that Mr. Blazer had a cause of

action for personal injuries growing out of the May 12th
accident.

Johnson then promptly reported the matter

to the defendant insurance company and attorney Olson
brought suit against J-ohnson for Blazer. The Insurance
Co1npany declined to defend the Blazer action, Johnson
employed his O"\Vn council and eventually paid a judgn1ent against hi1n in that action. This is an action on
Johnson's Insurance policy against the defendant Company for dan1ages for failure to defend the Blazer action
and to pay the judg1nent in that case as required by the
ter1ns of the policy. The case was tried to a jury where
the plaintiff had a verdict and judg1nent against the
defendant for the amount of the judgment paid by him
plus attorneys fees.
No con1plaint is n1ade here as to the an1ount of the
verdict the only errors assigned being as to the instructions of the court which submitted to the jury the
question of "rhether defendant Johnson had notice of
the accident and (2) whether it reasonable appeared
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to be so trivial as not to require reporting to Insurance
Con1pany.
On the 12th day of :\Jay, 1954, w·hen the InJury
oeeulTed to

~f r.

Blazer, it is apparent fro1n the record.

that no one, including

~·I

r. Blazer, treated his InJUries

other than as a trivial n1atter.

Mr. Blazer himself

testified that he only rnissed two-days vvork in two
n1onths (R255).
According to his own testimony (R257), he states
that he had informed sorneone he called, that "he had
had a minor accident.'' He called on the third day
after the accident to sorneone in Johnson's office, but
he did not knovv to vvhorn he was talking, but he said he
asked for the bookkeeper (R258) and he couldn't remember \vhat the person on the other end of the call
said. ....;\..nd, it was not until counsel for appellant suggested that it was the bookkeeper (R258) that he said,
"I think he said he vvas the bookkeeper." The bookkeeper, Mr. Quinney, denied that he ever talked to }fr.
Blazer (R223). 1fr. Blazer doesn't recall whether the
party on the other end of the line did anything but
answer the phone, as he could not recall anything that
was said by that party (R259).
Mr. Olsen, the driver of the truck talked to hirn
son1e time during the summer when he was again delivering concrete to Mr. Blazer and asked him how he "Tas
getting along, and Mr. Blazer replied that he was getting
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along \vith his work and did not make any mention
\vhatsoever about his injuries (R266). And upon crossexalnina tion ~1r. Olsen further stated ( R267), and this
was sometilne in the su1nmer of 1954, that Blazer told
hin1 that he thought he would be all right and he didn't
think that it (the accident) had hurt him, and Olsen at
the time of the accident tried to get him (Blazer) to let
him (Olsen) take him to the doctor, but Blazer refused
to go to the doctor (R263-264).
It should be borne in mind that the witness, Mr.
Olsen, was called on behalf of the appellant and \vas
not at the tin1e of the trial working for Johnson: and
when Mr. Olsen talked to ~fr. Taggart, the batch plant
n1an for Johnson, he testified on direct examination
that he did not tell l\ir. Taggart that Blazer had been
hurt seriously (R268).
As further indication that ~1r. Blazer hin1self treated the n1atter onl:~ as trivial, the record shows (R27327 4-275) he never testified that he talked ·w-ith Taggart
about it. The very day after the accident (the \Vord Januar~~ is in error in the record and it should be the
n1onth of l\tfay) and on at least seven occasions shortly
thereafter~ Blazer ordered concrete personally from
Tag-gart, and on none of these occasions did he say anything at all about his injury. Taggart testified that one
tin1e (R276) Blazer called hiin and told hi1n that a truck
had "bumped" him, but the record shows that Taggart
l1arl jnfornlatjon~ or at least believed, that Blazer was
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suffering frou1 a previou~ injury to his back (R277),
and as coun:--;el

~tates

in his brief, the mattPr vvas neYer

brought to .\I r. Quinney's attention according to the
testilnon)~ of Taggart and Olsen (P. :-~).
Taggart's
te~tirnony

is to the effect that at one tirne before the

accident he called on Blazer (R277) at Blazer's horne
where he \Vas crippled up with his back at the tirne; so
that the verdict of the jur_v under the instructions of the
Court \vould arnount to the finding that all parties
treated the n1atter as so trivial as not to require the1n
to give notice to the insurance cornpany.
Finally, the facts are that neither Johnson or any of
the officers of his cornpany, knew of this matter until
they \Vere served notice of the clain1 of 11r. Blazer
against Johnson by the attorney for Mr. Blazer, Charles
P. Olson on May 14, 1957 (Pl.'s Ex. No. 11). Thus,
the rnatter rested, so far as Johnson or any of his
ernployees "\vere concerned, in cornplete silence fron1 a
few days after the accident until receipt of the Olson
letter, during vvhich time 1\[r. Blazer was undergoing
rnedical and surgical treatment and hospitalization and
incurring large bills, for vvhich Johnson has fully paid
and now claims reimbursen1ent under the policy written
b~,.

the appellant.

Johnson did everything possible to get the appellant to defend the suit under the terms of the policy, but
it declined to defend the same, refusing on the grounds
that it had not been notified as soon as practicable (See
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.b~xhibits

his own

3 to 13 inclusive).
attorney~.

Johnson finally e1nployed

These exhibits were not admitted in

evidence, but their contents were stipulated to (R206).
~~he

record and exhibits a1nply show that the matter

''Tas diligently pursued by Johnson after such notice was
had fro1n attorney Olson that the insurance company
had every possible opportunity given it to take over the
defense after it had 1nade its complete investigation
of the case.

1T nder the instructions of the Court given for and
guidance upon a sub1nitted general verdict, the jury has
found that the n1atter \vas of such a trivial nature that
a rea~onahle 1nan would not he expected to report the
n1atter and it \vould be an excuse for failing to notify
the eon1pany, and further found apparently that under
the circu1nstances, the notice to the con1pany finally \vas
"Tit hin a reasonable tin1e.
The reeord sho,vs that the jury clearly had in mind
the question of \vhether or not the in~urance con1pany
had been notified af' soon a~ practicable, because the
jury returned to the eonrtroon1 ":herein the followingproceeding~ took place (R320).
'' ... son1e question about the n1eaning of the phrase
'a~ soon as practicable· 1nean~ that the notiee must be
given \vithin a reasonable ti1ne under the eireumstances
of thP ca~e. Tn~tantaneous notice i~ not contemplated,
hnt rather notice to he g-iYen \vith reasonable dispatch
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and \vithin a

rPaHonabh~

'

ti1ue in

viP\\'

of all the faet:s

and circtnnstance8 of the case. Now tnayhe that may not
be ver:, helpful, but that i8 a legal definition.''

P()INT I
rrHE

Ql':BJ~ri,ION

OF vVHETHER OR NOT

,JOHNSON

READY-~fiX

~;\CCIDENrl.,

W--:\S PROPERJjl'r SlTBMirl1 11 ED TO THE

HAD NOTICE OF THE

Jl-:-RY.
POINT Il
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WAS PROPERLY Slrg_
J\1:ITTED TO THE JlTRY.
POINT III
THE RECORD CLEARI_jY ESTABLISHES THAT
THE JURY DETERMINED THE ISSlTES IN
FA\TOR OF THE PI_jAINTIFF.
POINT I\T
ANY ERROR IN THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
COURT IN THIS C.A.SE WOULD NOT HA\:'"E
AFFECTED THE FINAL RESULT AND WOlTLD
THEREFORE BE HAR:\IIJESS.
ARGUMENT
Point I

THE Qr'"ESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT
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JOHNSON READY-MIX HAD NOTICE OF THE
ACCIDENT WAS PROPERI~Y SlTBMITTED TO THE
J1TRY.
The final issues sub1nitted by the court to the Jury
\\TP l'P aR f 0ll0\\1S : ( 1{148)
1. WaR any notice of the accident ever received by
the plaintiff corporation prior to May, 1957 ~

2. Did the accident appear so trivial or minor
(even though plaintiff found out about it \vi thin a few
days should you so find) as to not require that notice
of it be given to the defendant?
3. (If the two above are resolved in favor of the
plaintiff) H O\V 1nuch should he recover~
As to these issues submitted to the Jury the court in
In~truction No. 4 and No. 9 stated the respective partiec
theories in the alternative and left the matter for the
Jlll'~TO

The only testimony relied upon by the appellant
to establish that ~fr. Taggart had authority to receive
notice of the accident \Yas the testin1ony of Mr. Quinney
that he had instructed Taggart that if he had knowledge
of an arrirlent to report it to the offiee (R224-225).
l\{r. Taggart aeeording to his o\vn testimony only
had authority to send drivers to different place, "Thereever the orders were ealled for (R270). Aecording to
l\f r. tTohnson 's testin1ony speaking of Taggart's respons-
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ibilities ~'he'd get orders for concrete, he'd dispatch the
various trucks to different jobs (R246).
Counsel argues that the evidence was without conflict that Taggart had authority to receive notice of
accidents involving Ready lVI ix truck drivers and relay
such ~7 at-ice to Jlf r. Quinney.
rrhere is SOUle confuBion in the record grO\Ving OUt
or the Courts sustaining the objection to the testimony
of ~lr. Quinne:v \vith respect to how clain1s in insurance
cases "\V"ere processed by the co1npany that the clai1ns
were all processed through his ( Quinneys) office and
that he kne\v of no other or individual agent or en1ployee
that 'vas authorized to process clain1s of this nature.
(R215).
However Mr. Quinney did testify
Q. Do you know of any instance where any person
other than through your office has ever processed a
claim~

_._t\..

T don't.

Q. Or how many claims - could you just tell me
whether there have been a few or several claims made
by your company against the United Pacific Insurance
Company~

A. There have been several.
Q. And who processed those ·claims.
A. I did.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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r:J~I-LBJ

COlTRrr (To Attorney Christensen): You
(Quinne~T)

a<hnit that he
husine~~

took care of the insurance

for the (jompany.

~IR.

CHRISTENSEN: Yes, we adn1it that he

handled, through l-Jatch
r-PHF~

the placing-

COr;RT: A.nd con1municated through to your

con1pan:·. He
~1R.

~;\gency,

\Ya~

the co1nmunicating officer.

CHRISTENSEN: "Yes" (R217).

Then on cross examination Quinney at (R224)
testified he as office manager instructed the employees
including Taggart that they should report accidents to
the offiee.
_l.

\t page 225 of the record Quinney testified:

Q. (By Atty.
~truetion~

driYer~

to

~[r.

Chri~tensen)

: Did you giYe any

In-

Taggart \Yith respeet to telling the

\vhat the proeeedure "-as in connection \vith re-

porting accidents?
A. Yes.
(~. ~\nd

\\"hat did you tell

~lr.

Taggart 1n that

regard~

.:\. Thnt if w·e had an accident to report it.
Q. ln other

an:·

aeeident~

Mr.

Taggart~

\Vords~

the trurk driYers \Yere to report

of "Thieh they kne":- to \Yho, to you or to
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~\.

Well to either one a.s lon9 as it got to the office.

(Our e1nphasis).
(~uinne~'

tPstified that he \Vas the only

e111plo~Te

in

the office PXe(·pt }Irs. Johnson helped hi1n oecasionally.

(R223).
'That Blazer never talked to hiin about the Blazer
accident (R250), and he knew nothing of the accident
until he received attorney Olson's letter in 1957 (R219).
It is

~ub1nitted

that the proceedure outlined

i~

a

reasonable Inethod of proceeding to get the information
to the one officer in the organization who could then
notify the insurance company in orderly manner, he
being acl1uainted "\Vith the practice in processing such
matter, and that it surely does not establish as a 1natter
of la-\v that the knowledge of Taggart "\vas kno,vledge to
the co1npany of the Blazer accident.
It is respectfully submitted that this evidence is a
far cry from undisputed evidence that Taggart \vas
such an officer of the Company that notice to Taggart
was notice to the Co1npany. All it really establishes
that Taggart like the other employes including the
drivers were instructed to report any accident coming
to their knowledge to Mr. Quinney at the office.
The court apparently interpreted this evidence to
present a jury question not as to whether Taggart kne\v
of the bump but
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1. Was Taggart such an agent or officer of the
C~orporation

that .notice to him 'vas notice to the corp-

oration-~

2. If Taggart did receive notice of the accident,
whether he properly concluded that the accident was so
trivial that it need not be reported.
The first question, now complained of by appellant
n1ight well have been decided by the court that there
'vas insufficient evidence of Taggart being an authorized
officer of the Corporation that notice to him was notice
to the corporation.

The court left the matter to the

jury which action was in appellants favor and ought not
to be complained of now. The jury very properly interpreted the evidence to establish that Taggart was a
bateh n1ixer and dispatcher of cen1ent and not an officer
of the corporation to reeeive notice of accidents and report the ~arne to·the insurance con1pany. -\"Vhile there n1ay
not have been direct disputes in the evidence as to Taggart's duty to report the accident to the office the court
apparently felt that the eYidenre "~as such that n1ore than
one interpretation of the evidence 'vas possible and for
that reason subn1itted the question to the jury, as
follows:

"If the jury believes that the witness Taggart was
a ~upervising agent or a person authorized to accept
notice for and on behalf of the plaintiff, then whatever
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notice Taggart had of the accident is notice to the plaintiff.
lf, on the other hand, you find that Taggart was a
1n~re

bateh plant operator with authority to mix the

('Pinent, reePive orders for cen1ent and dispatch the haulPr .. .; to the respective customers 'vith no supervisory or

other such authority or power in the conduct of the businP~~

of the corporation then notice to Taggart would not

be notice to the plaintiff'' (In st. No. 9 R155).

It is submitted this instruction is most favorable to
the appellant and one about which he can have no just
complaint. The jury had a right to find and by the great
preponderance of the evidence could only find that the
secretary and office manager, Quinney, was the person
who was to receive notice of all claims and process them
(R240-217). There was no error in submitting the
que~tions to tlH-' jury.
Counsel cites the case of Olsen, et al., v Warwood,
et al., 123 1Ttah 11, 255 P .2d 725 ( 1953). In that case
con1plaint was made of an instruction that in weighing
evidence pertaining to the drivers alleged negligence it
was the jury's duty to consider it under all the facts and
circumstances existing at the time of the accident and
not to consider it as a jury would in looking back on the
events from a later date. The instruction was approved
by the court and while the court there stated that there
must be evidence upon which to base and instruction, it
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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said at page 728, "It is manifest however, that a jury
rnay find any fact which must reasonably and of necessity flow frou1 other facts which were in evidence''.
This case does not support appellants proposition that
the instruction in thi8 case is in error.
The case of Woolverton v. Fidelity and Casualty
Company of New York, (N.Y., 1907) 82 N. E. 745, cited
by appellant held that knowledge of a driver \Yho cau~ed
an accident is not imputed to the insured, and the case
is distinguishable from the case at bar in that there is
no evidence that Taggart was authorized in the natural
conduct of business to receive reports of accidents, other
than to report them to the office. (R225).
The Oregon case of Hoffman v. Employers Liability
Assur. Corp., Ltd., (Ore., 1934) 29 P.2d 557, cited by the
appellant with extensive quotes, was a somewhat sin1ilar
case as to this case. The portions quoted in appellants
brief are not the parts of the decision that controls the
case and a judgment in that case in favor of the plaintiff
and against the insurance company was affirmed. The
trial court in the case at page 564 found that agent
Donaca's information as to the happening of the accident
was so indefinite and uncertain in its nature as to constitute no notice to the plaintiff that an accident covered
by the policy had happened. The case was decided by a
divided court but the majority concluded that the insured had not received notice of sufficient facts to give
notice to the insurance company.
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rrhP }aRt

('H~e

eited

h)~

the appellants under this point

was Latses r. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 lTtah 214, 104 P.2d
()19 ( 1~)--l-0) has no hearing upon this case.
\\·n~

\\~hether

prPini~(·~ h)~

The question

notice of i1nprove1nents on the owners
tla· tenant 'vas ilnputable to the owner for

the purpo~P of e~tablishing that tl1e O"\vner acted in bad
l'aith and it \vas held not evidence of bad faith. The facts
in this case have no application to establish any rule
applicable to the law in the case at bar.
_...\s to the second question sub1nitted to the jury to-

2. Did the accident appear so trivial or minor (even
though plaintiff found out about it within a few days,
should you so find) as to not require that notice of it
he given to defendant?" (Instruction No. 2, R.148).
The testimon~~ of ~~r r. Taggart clearly indicates that
he c-onsidered the bump to Blazer to be a trivial or Ininor
1natter. This is evident when he stated in answer to a
que~tion by ~r r. Christensen (R.270).

Q. "\\T1Jen did you first hear anything at all about
that (speaking of the accident).
A. It was \Yithin the next day or two. He called
me on the telephone, placing an order. In doing so he
mentioned that he had been bumped by one of the
trucks.''

Q. Now, I asked you what he said.
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A. Well, that a truck had backed up and he had got
bumped in the back son1e. He didn't say that he \Vas
hurt seriously or anything of the kind.''

Q. Did you later make any follow up of that report
by

~Jr. Blazer~''

. A._. "No. We n1ade no follow-up. Well, we just
thought it was a trivial matter, because he hadn't see1ned
very jmpressed about it, and there was nothing further
said. We thought if he had been injured he'd certainly
have let us kno"T how badly'' ( R.271 see also R.272).
According to Mr. Taggart, Blazer never complained
of the injury (R.272, R.278) and he never kne\v anyn1ore
about it until almost 3 years later (R.272). This even
though Blazer placed numerous orders for cement commencing the day following the accident, May 13~ 1954
and for several days thereafter throughout the year

(R.275 ).
It is therefore apparent that the action of Blazer
lead Taggart and all others who know of the accident
to believe that this was a trivial matter and therefore
the law does not require that notice of this sort of accident to be given. The rule is set forth in 18 ALB. 2d
443,475 as follows :
''Since the requirement that notice of the
occurrence of an accident ·be given refers only to
accident which caused a loss covered by the policy,
delay in giving notice is generally held excusable
in case of an accident which is trivial and re-
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sult in no apparent har1n, or which furnishes no
ground for the insured, acting as a reasonable
and prudent rnan, to believe at the time that a
clai1n for dan1age will arise. (See cases cited in
annotation at page 475).
The test of this rule seerns to be :
''When there has been such an occurence or
accident as would lead the ordinary prudent and
reasonable man to believe that it might give rise
to a clai1n for damages.'' Nye v. Louis Ostrove
Shoe Co. (1942 Ohio App) 43 N.E. 2d 103, 18 ALR
2d 475.
The annotation continue8:
''Another case in which the doctrine of trivial
occurrence has been defined with lucidity and
clarity is Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Anderson's
Groves, Inc. (1949. CA 5th Fla) 176 F. 2d 246,
\Yhere the court stated that the duty of an jnsured under the provision of an automobile liability policy requiring him to give the insurer
written notice of an accident ''as soon as practicable'' does not mean that every trivial accident
that occurs should be reported, but only an accident that an ordinarily prudent individual acting
reasonably would consider, under all the circumstances, as consequential and which could afford
the basis of a claim. The court added the rule
that not every trivial mishap or occurrence must
be reported applies even though it may prove
afterward that the occurrence originally thought
to be trivial results in serious injury.~' (ours)
Plaintiff contends that the Doctrine of Trivial occurrence as above set forth applies in this case. Knowledge that a claim would be presented did not come until
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after 3 years had lapsed and immediately notice of this
was given to the defendant. The requirement of notice
under the policy 'vas met by the giving of this notice.
The controlling issue in this case seems to be was
notice of the accident given ''as soon as practicable'' as
required by the

policy~

In this connection the jury re-

turned to the Courtroom after deliberating for son1e
time and inquired as to its legal definition.

(R.320)~

The Court: ''Some question about the meaning of
the phase 'as soon as practicable' : ''
''The phrase 'as soon as practicable' means
that the notice must be given within a reasonable
time under the circumstances of the case. _.._-\_n instantaneous notice is not contemplated, but rather
notice to be given with reasonable dispatch and
within a reasonable time in view of all of the
facts and circumstances of the case. Now maybe
that isn't helpful, but that is a legal definition'·
(R.321).
In Munz v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. 26
Utah 69, 72 P. 182, 183, (1903) this court announced
the rule:
''It does not, by any fair construction of the
policy, mean instantly, but 'immediate notice·
means notice within a reasonable time, under all
the circumstances of each particular case . . .
It would, however, be both an unreasonable and
unfair interpretation to hold that, as used in the
policy, the word 'immediate' required the doing
of a thing impossible for the be_neficiary to do.
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Such provisions ntust receive reasonable construction in favor of the beneficiary.''

rrhP eourt

eontiilllP~:

'~

l\l a~·, in his work on Insurance, \ . . ol 2 See-tion ±62, says : 'If the notice be required to be
forthwith, or as soon as possible' or 'immediately' it will meet the requirement if given with due
diligence under the circumstances of the case, and
without unnecessary and unreasonable delay, of
which the JURY ARE ORDINARILY TO BE
rrHE JtTDGES (emphasis added). To give the
word a literal interpretation would in most cases
strip the insured of all hope of indemnity, and
policies of insurance would become practically
engines of fraud.''
The delay in this case was the fault of Blazer and
not of the plaintiff.
The jury therefore, in considering all of the evidence
In thi~ ea~e properly concluded that notice was given
''a~ ~oon a~ practicable'' and the verdict should not be
reYel·~ed

by thi~ court \vhieh did not hear all of the
evidenee and -w·itness the demeanor of the witnesses who
\Vere called to testify. The appellant is Inerely speculating \Yhen it concludes that the jury verdict was based
upon an erronous instruction. The important question
i~

'vhether or not notice was given to the defendant
''a!" soon as practicable'' and the jury by its verdict
concluded that it was, and also concluded that the matter
\Y'a~ of such a trivial nature as it appeared to plaintiff
tl1at no notice was required until the letter from attorneY Olsen was received 3 years later.
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r~oint

II

THERI~

WAS NO ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.9.
'Phis instruction is fully set forth in appellants brief.
The Inajor portion of this instruction was prepared from
the case of Shafer t·. U.S. Casualty Co., Wash. 1916, 156
P. 861.
It is contended by the respondent that this instruction is fair and proper and a correct statement of the
law. It is favorable to the appellant in the portion not
requested by the plaintiff viz: that the witness Quinney
\vas at all times an officer of the corp and that any
notice received by Quinney would be notice to the corp.
R155.
The evidence referred to in point No. 1 and the
portions of the record therein cited furnish ample evidence that should justify the court in giving instruction No. 9. Without this instruction or a similar instruction covering the proposition envolved the jury \vould
have had no guidance whatever with respect to plaintiff's
theor~r of the case. Instructions as a "Thole ''rere a fair
presentation of the theories of both parties and the
jury under the instructions properly determined that
the technical defense by the insurance con1pany~ that the
company did not have notice, was not well taken.
With respect to the contention that the instruction
contains improper comment~ on the evidence the appel-
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lant cites the case of Fox v. Taylor (Utah 1960) 350 P.
2d 154.

In that case, as here, the so called comment

(•ontplained of was in the instructions.

The rule recog-

nized in the quote in the brief page 17 was not applied
in the tase. In the next sentence the court decides that
there ''Tas no offensive com1nent in the instruction and
says:
"Yet it must be realized that it is quite impossible to frame instructions applicable to a
given case without making some reference to facts
and sometimes evidence. The court elsewhere told
the jury that it was their perogative to detern1ine
the facts and they should do so solely upon the
basis of the evidence.''
This case is an authority that the appellant's complaint against instruction No. 9 is not well taken.
Point III
THE JURY PROPERLY DETERMINED THE
ISS1-.-ES IN FA\ 1 0R OF THE PLAINTIFF.
If there is any evidence and every reasonable inference fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light moat
favorable to the plaintiff the verdict will not be interfered with on appeal Holland v. Moreton (Utah 1960)
353 P.2d 989 and a long line of earlier cases.
Point IV
HARMLESS ERROR.
Without conceding any error in the record and for
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the purpose of argu1nent only if it be assumed that the
court erred in submitting question No. 1 to the jury, it
would clearly appear that such error is entirely harmless
under the peculiar facts of this case. Assuming that it
was the duty of the plaintiff to give notice of the facts
in this case such notice could have been nothing more
than that Blazer had bu1nped his back on the plaintiff
cement truck. That he stated at the time that he had not
been injured and that the matter did not amount to anything.

That he continued at work the next day and for

several days thereafter without complaint and on several
occasions he talked to Mr. Taggart without complaining
to him.

If the insurance Company argues that this in-

formation would have permitted a nominal settlement
with Blazer because he and all others concerned believed
the accident to be trivial, it is contending that insurance
is for the purpose of n1aking nominal settlements. Failure to give notice of these trivial facts could in no way
have prejudiced the rights of defendant Rule 61, URCP,
see also Startin v. Madsen, (120 Ut. 631) 237 P2d 834.
CONCLUSION
The court properly submitted the case to the jury
on all questions of fact. Under the evidence the Jury
not only properly decided the issues in favor of the
plaintiff but it was their duty to do so. The judgment
should be affirmed at appellants' costs.
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Dated September 10, 1960.
Respectfully submitted,
PRESTON & HARRIS,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
Cache Valley Bank Bldg.,
Logan, Utah
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